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Abstract 
This article explores historical experiences in France and Brazil and the 
contemporary constitutional set-up in China where parliaments are empowered to 
adjudicate constitutional issues. It also identifies the lessons thereof for the 
constitutional design in Ethiopia. Comparison among three legal regimes has been 
made with regard to the rationales and contexts under which legislative or non-
legislative parliaments were entrusted with the power of interpreting constitutions. 
The experience in France (1799 to 1946), Brazil (1824-1891) and China‟s current 
practice in constitutional interpretation are examined. The experiences across time 
in different jurisdictions are used to analyze the extent to which (non-)legislative 
assemblies are appropriate organs to adjudicate constitutional issues. The 
Constitution of Ethiopia is expected to take lessons from the difficulties 
encountered from the experiences of France, Brazil and China and resort to other 
institutional choices for constitutional adjudication. 
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Introduction 
The current Ethiopian Constitution adopts ethnic federalism by accommodating 
diversity as „building bricks‟ of the federal system.1 One third of the 
constitutional provisions deal with human rights including socio-economic and 
environmental rights, and it gives due attention to the rights of women, child 
rights etc. The Constitution declares that the federation is established by the 
„free‟ agreement2 of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (hereinafter the 
„NNPs‟); and it also declares that Sovereign political power resides in them. 
The Constitution was, however, criticized because of its making process and 
content. Many scholars have contested its legitimacy arguing that the making 
process did not include significant political actors, the discussions were more of 
educational rather than taking inputs from the population, and the whole process 
was dominated by the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(hereinafter „EPRDF‟) and hence it lacks original legitimacy.3 Others also 
criticized it on the ground that the federal structure tilts more towards the „self-
rule‟ rather than the „shared rule‟4 considering it as a „recipe for disaster‟. The 
existence of highly centralized political party which has dominated the political 
sphere since the promulgation of the Constitution was also considered as 
making the federal arrangement „dysfunctional‟.5 
Absence of strong form of constitutional review which keeps government 
organs within their constitutional limits was also another criticism. The 
Constitution empowers the House of Federation (hereinafter „the HoF‟), assisted 
by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (hereinafter „the CCI‟), as an organ 
empowered to interpret the Constitution. Some criticize this mechanism of 
constitutional adjudication as highly politicized indicating „absence of effective 
domestic safeguards against regression into rule by law‟6 rather than rule of law. 
Others criticize it stating that it silences ordinary courts from protecting human 
                                           
1
 See generally Assefa Fiseha (2006), Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in 
Ethiopia: Comparative Study, Wolf Legal Publishers, The Netherlands. 
2
 The Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, Federal Negarit 
Gazeta, Proc. No. 1/1995, No.1, 1st year 1995,Paragraph 1 of the Preamble. 
3
 See for instance, Tsegaye Regassa (2010), “The Making and legitimacy of the Ethiopian 
Constitution: Towards Bridging the gap between Constitutional Design and Constitutional 
Practice”, Africa Focus, Volume 10, No.1, pp. 85-118. Available at: 
  <www.gap.ugent.be/africafocus/pdf/vol23_1_making.pdf> 
4
 See for instance, Assefa Fiseha, supra note 1, pp. 297-300. 
5
 See for instance, Aberra Degefa (2005), “The Scope of Rights of National Minorities under 
the Constitution of FDRE”, Series on Ethiopian Constitutional Law, Volume 1. 
6
 Adem K. Abebe (2012), “Rule by law in Ethiopia: Rendering constitutional limits on 
government power nonsensical”, CGHR Working Paper 1, Cambridge: University of 
Cambridge Centre of Governance and Human Rights, pp. 15-16. Available at: 
   <https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/245111> 
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rights and the HoF lacks the requisite independence to exercise the necessary 
checks and balances against government organs and as such does not protect 
human rights.7 There is plentiful scholarly literature that critically analyses the 
fact that the HoF cannot effectively interpret the Constitution, as a result of 
different recommendations are forwarded. 
The tradition of empowering parliaments to interpret constitutions in socialist 
states was more common and currently exists in China where the National 
People's Congress (hereinafter the „NPC) is empowered to do so by virtue of 
Article 62 of the 1982 Constitution. This arrangement was categorized as one of 
the weak forms of constitutional review which gave unlimited power to the 
government and ultimately to the Communist Party of China (hereinafter „the 
CPC‟).8 Therefore, Ethiopia should draw lessons from historical and 
contemporary failures and difficulties.  
So far, scholarly works have addressed the issue of whether a parliament 
could effectively interpret constitutions both theoretically and in practice.9 But, 
this issue has not been explored from historical perspectives by comparing 
similar past arrangements with the current ones. The main purpose of this article 
is to explore the experiences of constitutional adjudication by parliaments in 
France before 1946, Brazil before 1891 and contemporary China with a view to 
drawing some lessons to Ethiopia.  
Historically, France and Brazil have experienced failure in such arrangement 
which led to other institutional arrangements: France to Conseil Constitutionnel 
and Brazil to the Supreme Court. The contemporary constitutional arrangement 
                                           
7
 Chi Mgbako et al (2008), “Silencing the Ethiopian Courts: Non-Judicial Constitutional 
Review and its Impact on Human Rights”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 32, 
Issue 1, pp. 259- 297. Available at <http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj/vol32/iss1/15/> 
8
 See for instance, Cheng Xueyang (2014), “Institutional Developments, Academic Debates 
and Legal Practices of the Constitutional Review in China: 2000-2013”, Frontiers of Law 
in China, 9: pp. 636-656. Available at <http://academic.hep.com.cn/flc/EN/10.3868/s050-
003-014-0040-1>; Guobin Zhu (2010), “Constitutional Review in China: An 
Unaccomplished Project or a Mirage?”, Suffolk University Law Review, 43: pp. 593-624. 
Available at  
    <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1664949&download=yes> 
9
 See for instance, Assefa Fiseha (2007), “Constitutional Adjudication in Ethiopia: Exploring 
the Experience of the House of Federation”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 pp. 1-32; 
Getachew Assefa (2010), “All About Words: Discovering the Intention of the Makers of 
the Ethiopian Constitution on the Scope and Meaning of Constitutional Interpretation”, 
Journal of Ethiopian Law, Vol. 24, No. 2; Tsegaye Regassa (2009), “Making Legal Sense 
of Human Rights: The Judicial Role in Protecting Human Rights in Ethiopia”, Mizan Law 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 288-330; Takele Soboka (2011), “Judicial Referral of 
Constitutional Disputes in Ethiopia: From Practice to Theory”, African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, Edinburgh University Press, Vol. 19, No.1.  
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of China is selected as a case study for several reasons. China is one of the very 
few, if not the only jurisdiction besides Ethiopia, to uniquely empower the 
legislative body to interpret the Constitution. As the purpose of this article is to 
show historical failures/difficulties of such arrangements and draw lessons to 
Ethiopia, the historical and current experiences of China adds an interesting and 
useful insight. The ideological resemblance between the regimes that shaped 
constitution-making in both jurisdictions adds another justification to include 
China‟s experience to this comparison. Therefore, an overview of the historical 
context that led to such constitutional arrangement in China is discussed along 
with some practical insights with the same purpose of deriving lessons to 
Ethiopia. The article, however, does not go further into the issue of which 
institutional arrangement is suitable for Ethiopia.   
The first section of this article discusses the reasons why constitutions are 
interpreted and the commonly known institutional choices that should adjudicate 
constitutional disputes. Regardless of differences in institutions, constitutional 
adjudication has the purpose of at least ensuring supremacy of the constitutions, 
defining the scope of fundamental rights and as such protects them from acts of 
government organs that violate rights and adjudicating disputes among 
government organs. In view of these objectives, two common models of 
constitutional adjudication have been identified. The first model is the 
decentralized model where ordinary courts can interpret the constitution, while 
in the second centralized model a single specialized court is charged with the 
task. Constitutional adjudication by (non-)legislative parliaments has also been a 
rare institutional choice which is currently used in two countries.  
The second section explores and analyses the experience of France between 
the 1789 French Revolution until the 1946 Constitution where the Sénat was 
empowered to review the constitutionality of legislations. The rationale is also 
discussed along with the context which led to such arrangement. This section 
discusses the 1824 Constitution of Brazil where the General Assembly was 
given the task of constitutional interpretation. It also identifies the lessons that 
should be derived from the experiences of France and Brazil to similar 
contemporary arrangements in Ethiopia. 
The third and fourth sections deal with constitutional adjudication in China 
by the NPC with its Standing Committee (hereinafter „the NPCSC) and in 
Ethiopia by the HoF/CCI by focusing on why (non-)legislative assemblies are 
empowered to interpret the constitutions. The reasons that triggered such 
arrangements are partly similar to the extent that both rely on popular 
supremacy: supremacy of working people expressed through the supremacy of 
the NPC and supremacy of the NNPs as exercised by the HoF. However, the 
NNPs are authors of the Constitution and have final say on it whereas the NPC 
as the government organ supervises the Constitution. This section also discusses 
their operations and identifies lessons (to Ethiopia) that can be discerned from 
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the failures of the NPC of China. However, the issue of which institutional 
choice best fits Ethiopia is beyond the scope of this article.   
1. Constitutional Adjudication: Theoretical Foundations 
Constitutional adjudication10 has attracted the attention of many scholars across 
the globe as one of the main areas of comparative constitutional law. Even if the 
main focus of the article is to explore constitutional adjudication by parliaments 
particularly in the constitutional history of France and Brazil and similar 
contemporary arrangements in the constitutions of China and Ethiopia, it would 
be apt to discuss the reasons why constitutions are interpreted and which 
institutions are preferred in developed and stable constitutional systems. Hence, 
this section briefly highlights the reasons why constitutions are interpreted and 
the common models of constitutional interpretation. 
1.1 The ‘why’ of constitutional interpretation 
Constitutions are fundamental laws that have the purpose of establishing and 
structuring governments, guaranteeing fundamental rights and determining the 
relationship between the government and citizens. They constitute a government 
and hence governments are expected to conform to this higher law. 
Constitutions confer legitimacy over government‟s action and empower a 
government.11 They may also include „aspirational‟ functions by „picturing the 
best sort of community people could attain through its constitutional 
arrangements and commandments‟.12 In the course of „creating and building up 
a modern democratic society, the constitution appears as an act of 
institutionalizing the political system, but also as a means and guarantor of 
securing the fundamental democratic, political, and social relations‟.13 
Constitutional interpretation refers to the task of safeguarding the supremacy 
of a constitution and keeping laws and actions of government within the 
constitutional limits. Constitutional interpretation has been considered as one of 
the main mechanisms to protect fundamental rights enshrined in constitutions 
                                           
10
 Even if the meaning of the expressions „constitutional adjudication‟ and „constitutional 
interpretation‟ may not be exactly the same, they are used interchangeably in this article 
as it may not have an impact on the issue under consideration. 
11
 Walter F. Murphy, James E. Fleming, Sotirios A. Barber (1995), American Constitutional 
Interpretation, The Foundations Press Inc., New York, p. 3. 
12
 Id. p. 4 
13
 Pavle Nikolic (2011), “Constitutional Review of Laws by Constitutional Courts and 
Democracy: Problem of Legitimacy”, in Mahendra P. Singh (ed.), Comparative 
Constitutional Law, Eastern Book Company, Lucknow, p. 38. 
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from actions of government by defining the scope of rights.14 Legislation 
enacted by either the lawmaker or executive organ should be checked for 
compatibility with the constitution primarily with a view to check whether such 
acts of government violate fundamental rights, and secondarily to keep balance 
of power among organs of government themselves.15 Therefore, constitutional 
interpretation is generally a means of ascertaining supremacy of constitutions. 
Depending on jurisdictions, constitutional interpretation may have one or 
more of the following proposes: to limit governmental powers, to keep 
supremacy of constitutions by ensuring that all laws and decisions conform to 
the constitution, and to keep balance of power in federations. Constitutions in 
federal countries include agreements and bargains hence considered as 
„covenant‟. There should be an impartial arbiter to solve disputes that may arise 
on division of power between the two levels of government.16 
One of the reasons to interpret constitutions may be that clauses or phrases of 
constitutional texts are unclear as to their meanings. Framers of constitutions 
often adopt flexible language to make a workable constitution or owing to 
difficulties of including compromises and balancing of values. 17 James Madison 
identified three sources of difficulties in framing the US Constitution: the 
complexity of the relations to be regulated, the imperfections of human notions 
about politics, and the inadequacy of words to convey complex ideas with 
precision and accuracy.18 Hence, constitutions are interpreted in order to clarify 
clauses and phrases which are not clear to apply to particular cases. 
Some clauses in constitutional texts may appear in potential conflict with 
others in order to apply them to particular cases.19 Some other constitutional 
clauses may have been framed very broadly or some parts of the constitutional 
text may be read as if it takes away what it granted by another clause. It is 
                                           
14
 See generally Armen Mazmanyan et al (2013), “Constitutional Courts and Multilevel 
Governance in Europe: Editors' Introduction”, in Armen Mazmanyan et al (eds.)(2013), 
The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance, Intersentia Publishing Ltd., 
Cambridge.  
15
 In France, interpreting a constitution was done primarily to inhibit the legislature from 
encroaching upon the powers of the executive. It was only in 1971 that the Conseil 
Constitutionnel decided that it also safeguards fundamental rights. See Sophie Boyron 
(2013), The Constitution of France: A Contextual Analysis, Hart Publishing Ltd., Oxford, 
pp. 150-151. 
16
 See Rudolf Dolzer (2011), „The Role of the Courts in the Preservation of Federalism: 
Some Remarks on the US and the German Experience‟, in Mahendra P. Singh (ed.), supra 
note 12, pp. 69-88. 
17
 Murphy et al, supra note 10,  p. 9. 
18
 Ibid.  
19
 Id., p. 10. 
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through constitutional interpretation that these constitutional clauses could be 
applied consistently. 
Another reason that justifies interpretation of constitutions may relate to 
omissions. Although succinct constitutional texts are desired, „this brevity 
means that much is left unsaid or only hinted at‟.20 Constitutional texts may not 
include all matters to be regulated owing to different reasons. However, such 
omissions may be remedied either by amendments if it is fundamental, or by 
interpretation.  
Unforeseen developments may necessitate interpretation of constitutions.21 In 
the context of the US Constitution, there were many matters that were not 
foreseen by the framers but that could be accommodated through constitutional 
interpretation which helped the Constitution to be the oldest constitution in the 
world.22 
In addition to problems and difficulties in constitutional texts, constitutions 
are interpreted with a view to ensure their supremacy and to ensure 
compatibility of legislation and executive action with constitutions. Review of 
constitutionality of legislation by interpreters of constitutions –most often 
supreme courts and constitutional courts– has been contested on the ground that 
it undermines democratic principles by empowering unelected judges to nullify 
legislation enacted by elected representatives which have direct mandate from 
the people.23 
1.2 Models of constitutional interpretation 
Even if there is a consensus that constitutions should be interpreted owing to the 
reasons discussed above, the issue of who should interpret them has been one of 
the most controversial issues in constitutional law. In the United States, ordinary 
courts interpret the Constitution while most European countries have established 
constitutional courts.24 In France, the Conseil Constitutionnel is empowered to 
interpret the Constitution. In China and Ethiopia, the constitution is interpreted 
                                           
20
 Id., p. 11. 
21
 Id., p. 12. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 See for instance, Helmut Steinberger, “Aspects of Judicial Review of the Constitutionality 
of Executive Actions in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Basic Outline”, in Mahendra 
P. Singh (ed.), supra note 13, pp. 29-32; Pavle Nikolic (2011), “Constitutional Review of 
Laws by Constitutional Courts and Democracy: Problem of Legitimacy”, in Mahindra P. 
Singh (ed.), supra note 13, pp. 33-48. 
24
 From among European countries, eighteen of them have established constitutional courts 
while only three countries have adopted the USA model of judicial review. See in general, 
Victor Ferreres Comella (2009), Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values: a 
European Perspective, Yale University Press, New Haven. 
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by a (non-)legislative chamber. These varieties of institutions indicate the 
disagreements on which institutions should interpret constitutions. 
The role of the organ entrusted with the power of interpreting a constitution 
includes the following:  
a) it ensures the supremacy clause of the Constitution;  
b) it provides the ultimate decision in constitutional disputes;  
c) in federations, it umpires the division of power between the federal 
government and the constituent units;  
d) it plays an adaptive role to the current change by keeping its spirit; and 
e) it enforces human rights.  
Given these important functions, institutions established to undertake such 
tasks are vital and hence should be impartial and independent. Over time, two 
models of constitutional adjudication have emerged: centralized and 
decentralized. These two models emerged in different jurisdictions and have 
their own peculiar features.  
1.2.1 Decentralized model 
In the United States and other countries that follow its practice, the power to 
interpret the constitution is vested in the ordinary courts which examine regular 
civil or criminal cases. In many countries, on the other hand, the judicial review 
power is given to the highest court of the land having jurisdiction both over 
general law matters and exclusive jurisdiction over all constitutional 
controversies.  
The decentralized model had its origin in the United States, where judicial 
review remains a most characteristic and unique institution.25 The idea of 
empowering ordinary courts to interpret the Constitution was constructed by 
interpretation in the Marbury v. Madison where Chief Justice John Marshall 
reasoned that „it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is‟ and to apply the constitution as a higher law to ordinary 
legislation.26 Marbury articulated a theory of judicial review in which courts 
could play a large role in national governance.27 In the United States, all judges, 
state and federal, can decide on constitutional issues.28 The authority to review 
                                           
25
 Mauro Cappelletti (1970), “Judicial Review in Comparative Perspective”, California Law 
Review, Vol. 58, Issue 5, p. 1026. Available at: 
<http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol58/iss5/1> 
26
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
27
 Mark Tushnet (2000), “Marbury v. Madison and the Theory of Judicial Supremacy”, in 
Robert P. George (ed.)(2000), Great Cases in Constitutional Law, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, p. 1.  
28
 Vicky Jackson & Mark Tushnet (2006), Comparative Constitutional Law, Foundation 
Press, 2
nd
 edition, New York p. 501.  
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the constitutionality of legislation is vested inherently in the judiciary in the 
USA while this task is entrusted upon constitutional courts in many European 
countries.29 The Federal Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review those 
decisions and could give authoritative interpretations which are binding on 
lower courts.30   
The power of judicial review is meant to „preserve the Constitution as a 
supreme law of the land‟ and „it involves two different missions: one directed 
towards the states and implicates principle of federalism, and the other addresses 
acts of executive and legislative branches‟.31 Ordinary courts could adjudicate 
constitutional issues only in concrete cases where there are real controversies. 
Hence, they cannot review constitutionality of legislation in abstract, i.e., in the 
absence of real disputes between parties.   
In order for the parties to bring such issues to the attention of courts, they 
should fulfil standing requirements: injury in fact, nexus between the injury and 
the unlawful act and redressability.32 These requirements are among the strict 
rules of standing to bring constitutional questions. „[I]t is in principle only the 
violation of a party interest which puts in motion the procedure of legislation‟.33 
It may then be questionable whether it is possible to contest the constitutionality 
of legislation which may not relate to a particular individual interest but affect 
the public at large.34 
                                           
29
 Alec Stone Sweet (2012), “Constitutional Courts”, in Michel Rosenfield and Andras Sayo 
(eds.)(2012), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p. 818. 
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Maeva Marcus (1995), “The Founding Fathers, Marbury vs Madison- and So What?” In 
Eivind Smith (ed.)(1995), Constitutional Justice under Old Constitutions, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, p. 25. 
32
 Alen v. Wright 468 U.S. 737 (1984). 
33
 Hans Kelsen (1942), “Judicial Review of Legislation: A Comparative Study of the 
Austrian and the American Constitution”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 193. 
Available at <http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.2307/2125770> 
34
 Here, environmental cases may be good examples. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided that Massachusetts has standing to sue the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency for failure to regulate the emission of „green gases‟ which contributed 
to global warming. However, there are cases like Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) where the claim against the constitutionality of 
act of the federal government (giving a real estate to a private Christian university under 
the supervision of a religious order as a violation of the „Establishment Clause‟) was 
rejected on the ground that the plaintiffs did not show the injury they suffered. See 
Norman Dorsen et al. (eds.), Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and Materials (St. 
Paul: Thomson/West, 2nd edition, 2010) pp. 168-170. 
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Decisions rendered by the US Federal Supreme Court on the 
unconstitutionality of legislation are binding on all parties, and government 
organs cannot apply the statute anymore. It also serves as a precedent that binds 
lower courts in entertaining similar constitutional issues.  
1.2.2 Centralized model 
The centralized model of constitutional review emerged in Europe after World 
War I.35 It was proposed by Hans Kelsen and was first established in Austria 
where he also served as constitutional judge.36 Kelsen feared that authorizing 
ordinary courts to refuse the application of unconstitutional legislation would 
create non-uniformity in constitutional questions.37 He also added that owing to 
the existence of administrative courts, contradiction among the decisions of 
courts was inevitable.38 Absence of precedence in many European countries was 
another reason for Kelsen to propose a different approach to constitutional 
adjudication than that of the US. Hence, he argued that these reasons necessitate 
the centralization of judicial review of legislation. The 1920 Austrian Constitution 
reserved judicial review of legislation to a special court called constitutional 
court.39 
There are different explanations why most European countries rejected the 
US model of constitutional adjudication. Part of the explanation focuses on the 
principle of separation of powers that emerged during the French Revolution of 
1789 and spread to many European countries, where judges were to have limited 
role.40 Many scholars have criticized this explanation on the ground that even if 
“it is important in explaining the rise of special bodies like constitutional courts 
in Europe, it does not give us justificatory reasons for their existence and for the 
particular details of their design”.41 
The second explanation is that European civil law countries cannot achieve 
legal certainty with the design similar to decentralized system of constitutional 
                                           
35
 Victor Ferreres Comella (2004), “The European Model of Constitutional Review of 
Legislation: Toward Decentralization?”, ICON, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 461,  
<icon.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/461.full.pdf>, last visited 04/04/2017 
36
 See John E. Ferejohn (2004), “Constitutional review in the Global Context”, Legislation 
and Public Policy, 6: pp. 49-59. Ferejohn argues that the Kelsean model of constitutional 
review spread throughout Europe because they wanted to enforce constitutional 
provisions after the collapse of authoritarian regimes. 
37
 Kelsen, supra note 33, pp. 184-186. 
38
 Ibid.  
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Comella, supra note 24, p. 10. Developments which led to restricting the role of courts in 
reviewing legislation will be discussed in detail in Part two.  
41
 Id., p. 19. 
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adjudication.42 The reasons include the existence of more than one supreme 
court because courts are specialized in different areas of the law and the doctrine 
of precedent does not serve as one of the sources of law in the civil law 
tradition.43 Therefore, the centralized model of constitutional review was partly 
explained by the conception of separation of powers and legal certainty.  
The centralized model of constitutional review refers to the existence of one 
single organ to interpret constitutions. A constitutional court is an independent 
organ of the state with the task of primarily ensuring superiority of the 
constitutional norm.44 In other words, it is only the constitutional court that 
reviews constitutionality of legislation and declare it unconstitutional. Portugal 
is one exception in that in addition to establishing constitutional court, it also 
empowers ordinary courts to set aside legislation they deem unconstitutional, 
but reserving the power to nullify such legislation only to the constitutional 
court.45 In addition, ordinary courts in some countries are empowered to set 
aside legislation that was enacted before the constitution came into force.46 
With respect to tasks allocated to constitutional courts other than reviewing 
the constitutionality of legislation, some courts have jurisdiction to supervise the 
regularity of election and referenda, to verify the legality of political parties or 
to enforce the criminal law against higher government officials.47 As Comella 
notes, “[t]he more important those other functions are, the larger the workload 
they generate, and the closer they are conceptually to the enforcement of 
ordinary law, the less pure constitutional court is”.48 
The issue as to who could bring cases to constitutional courts is important. 
The first type of procedure is through constitutional challenges, to be submitted 
by public institutions which challenge legislation in abstract in the absence of 
any controversy.49  A statute may be challenged before or after promulgation in 
different jurisdictions. The second type of procedure is through constitutional 
questions initiated during litigation in ordinary courts where judges stay 
proceedings and send the constitutional issue to the constitutional court if the 
ordinary court believes that a statute applicable in that particular case is 
unconstitutional.50 Some countries like Germany and Spain provide for a third 
                                           
42
 This justification was brought by Hans Kelsen. See Kelsen, supra note 33. 
43
 Comella, supra note 24, p. 21. 
44
 Stone Sweet, supra note 29, p.817. 
45
 Comella, supra note 35, p. 463. 
46
 Comella, supra note 24, p. 6. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Id., p. 6 
49
 Id., p. 7 
50
 Ibid. 
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type of procedure where individuals can file a constitutional complaint alleging 
that their fundamental rights have been violated.51 
Constitutional courts often review the constitutionality of legislation prior to 
the promulgation of laws. Such control of legislation is called „abstract review‟ 
which implies the absence of cases and controversies unlike the decentralized 
model. Here, a constitutional court „opines on the constitutionality of proposed 
or enacted legislation without regard to the application‟.52 France has been an 
archetypal for „pure‟ abstract review until the Conseil Constitutionnel was 
empowered in 2008 to review the constitutionality of legislation in concrete 
cases.53 
1.3 Constitutional adjudication by (non-)legislative houses 
At this juncture, it is important to mention that review of constitutionality of 
legislation by courts is not automatic. Institutional choices vary across 
jurisdictions. Even in the United States where there is strong judicial review, 
there are debates relating to whether it is compatible with democratic principles 
to allow unelected judge to quash legislation enacted by representatives which 
have direct mandate from the people. Many European countries have chosen 
constitutional courts. Some other jurisdictions have made a different 
arrangement by granting this power to (non-)legislative assemblies which are 
the focus of this article.  
In the spectrum of institutional choices empowered to adjudicate 
constitutional issues, one could find parliaments with or without legislative 
powers in some jurisdictions. There were some historical incidences where 
parliaments were empowered with such task. In France, since the Revolution of 
1789 up to the enactment of the 1946 Constitution, the Senat was the organ 
which used to adjudicate constitutional disputes. The Imperial Constitution of 
Brazil enacted in 1824 (on the verge of its independence) was another example 
where the Senate was empowered to interpret the Constitution.  
There are also contemporary examples for such arrangement. Currently, 
China and Ethiopia stand at odds as jurisdictions which empower a legislative 
and non-legislative parliament to interpret their constitutions.54 The 1982 
Constitution of Peoples‟ Republic of China authorizes the NPC to „supervise the 
                                           
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Michael C. Dorf (2009), “Abstract and Concrete Review”, in Vikram David Amar and 
Mark V. Tushnet (eds.)(2009), Global Perspectives on Constitutional Law, Oxford 
University press, New York, p. 3.  
53
 Ibid. 
54
 See Article 62(1) of the Ethiopian Constitution and Article 62(2) of the Constitution of 
Peoples Republic of China. 
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enforcement of the Constitution‟.55 The NPC is also supported by the Standing 
Committee which undertakes routine tasks of the NPC. Similarly, Article 62 of 
the 1995 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia authorizes the HoF 
(an upper chamber) to, inter alia, „interpret the Constitution‟. The experiences of 
constitutional adjudication in the jurisdictions mentioned above are discussed in 
detail in the next two sections.  
2. Historical Failures/Difficulties of Constitutional Adjudication 
by Parliaments in France and Brazil 
Constitutional history and comparative law shows that there were constitutions 
which empowered parliaments to adjudicate constitutional disputes. As has been 
highlighted in the preceding section, the constitutional history of France and 
Brazil can provide lessons to similar contemporary designs.  
2.1 Constitutions of France between 1799 and 1946 
After the French Revolution of 1789, courts were deliberately restricted, by law, 
from interfering in the legislative and administrative functions. The Sénat was 
instead empowered to interpret the constitution. There are explanations given to 
such arrangements.  
2.1.1 The reactions of the revolutionaries and the Sénat 
During the old regime (ancien régime), the parlements56 had active roles in the 
government process. Many historians consider the parlements as the last 
reflection of the tension between the aristocracy and the monarchy57 as they 
resisted many reforms. Particularly, the refusal of the Parlement of Paris to 
register edicts (that created new offices and which embodied reforms on 
monetary and fiscal controls and edicts of tax reforms) gave provincial 
parlements the same view and claims of resisting reforms by the aristocracy and 
the King.58 
Within the ancien régime, parlements had an active role in the legislative 
process; they could reject laws declared by the Kings. The courts had the right 
of remonstrance, which entitled them to refuse to register a King‟s decree which 
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(they believed) violates the „fundamental law‟ –principles that were developed 
in the courts for a long time.59 The judges of parlements affirmed that they had 
the power and obligation to „examine edicts and laws of the Kings‟ against the 
fundamental law.60 
By the 1750s, „the parlements had emerged as an articulate and determined 
opposition, resisting every effort at moderate reform that successive ministers 
sought to propose‟.61 There were frequent and stiff confrontations between the 
parlements and the King, which compelled the latter to make some reforms in 
the judiciary. This in turn led to judicial strikes thereby creating a tense 
relationship among them.62 These powerful courts kept their control over the 
King for a longer time until the eve of the Revolution.  
The French Revolution responded in a „hostile‟ manner to the powerful and 
arbitrary role played previously by the judiciary.63 This hostility to the role of 
judges has led the French constitutional thought for nearly two centuries to have 
the notion of „political‟ judicial review.64 There were several measures that 
aimed at excluding ordinary courts from the task of reviewing legislation. Such 
hostile approach began to take action in 1790 where a judicial reform was 
introduced by the Constituent Assembly, which required judges to apply and 
interpret statutes and precluded them from taking part in law-making 
functions.65 Similar prohibition against judges was incorporated in the 1791 and 
1795 Constitutions.  
The reaction against the role of courts in the ancien regime yielded different 
attempts to exclude the judiciary from the purview of constitutional review of 
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legislation which went through different proposals: in 1792, a special bench of 
„censors‟ was proposed to be established within the legislature; in 1793, a 
„national grand jury‟ was proposed to vindicate the rights of citizens oppressed 
by the legislature; in 1795, a „jurie constitutionnaire‟ was proposed to hear 
complaints relating to the unconstitutionality of legislation.66 These proposals 
helped prepare the terrain for a system of non-judicial review of 
constitutionality of legislation introduced in the 1799 Constitution, which 
empowered the Sénat with such review.  
With a view to limiting the powers of courts, a référé facultatif was instituted 
which obliged judges to look for binding interpretation of laws from the 
legislature in cases where they had doubts as to the meaning of a law.67 „Even 
the Tribunal de cassation, which was established in 1790-1791, originally had 
an extra judicial and essentially legislative nature‟.68 This Tribunal had the 
power of quashing judicial decisions which it considered conflicting with the 
letter of the law.69 As Cappelletti and Adams noted, if “the courts to which the 
case was then remanded persisted in the decision that the Tribunal had declared 
illegal, the case was referred to the legislature by the so-called référé obligatoire 
for a binding interpretation of the law”.70 These were some of the mechanisms 
of excluding courts from the process of making law to the extent of controlling 
how courts used to interpret legislation.  
With regard to the attempts to restrain courts from interfering in 
administrative functions, the task of legal validity of administrative acts was 
assumed by the Conseil de'Etat under the 1799 Constitution as a separate 
institution from the judiciary.71 Later on, the Conseil de'Etat was followed by 
lower administrative courts. Hence, it could be said that the Conseil de'Etat was 
the result of reactions of the revolutionaries against parlement's role in 
administrative functions. 
The Sénat conservateur was empowered by the Constitution of 1799 to check 
the constitutionality of legislation enacted by the Parliament. Beardsley states 
that the Constitution „empowered the Sénat as the guardian of the Constitution 
and that no statute might be promulgated without first being submitted to the 
Sénat, whose duty was to „oppose‟ the promulgation of unconstitutional 
                                           
66
 Id., pp. 208-209. 
67
 Cappelletti and Adams, supra note 60, p. 1212.  
68
 Ibid. The Tribunal de cassation was later developed into a judicial organ named Cour de 
Cassation.  
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid. The institutions of référé facultative and référé obligatoire were later abandoned. 
 
71
 Comella, supra note 24, p. 13. 
44                              MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 12, No.1                             September 2018 
 
 
legislation.72 This was a direct response to the previous role of parlements and it 
prohibited them from engaging in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. 
The same trend continued in the Constitution of 1852, and subsequently, it came 
to be deeply rooted in French constitutional law that rejected judicial review of 
legislation.  
Therefore, the reforms after the Revolution to minimize the role of pre-
revolution parlements started first by excluding them from taking part in the 
legislative and administrative functions. Then, it went onto allocating the power 
of interpreting the constitutions to the Sénat. This arrangement rejected the 
leading role of ordinary courts and paved a new era of constitutional 
interpretation by parliaments.  
One may wonder how the Sénat was composed and whether it was suitable to 
exercise its power of checking the constitutionality of legislation. The Sénat was 
composed of members recruited by co-option from a list of candidates submitted 
by the Corps législatif, the Tribunal and the First Consul. According to Article 
21 of the Constitution of 1799, the Sénat had the power to either maintain or 
annul acts referred to it by the Tribunal or the Government. It had no power to 
review the constitutionality of legislation after it was promulgated. However, the 
Sénat did not exercise its power of constitutional review until its disappearance 
from the Constitution in 1815. This is one clear lesson that constitutional 
adjudication by legislature has never worked.  
Despite the failure of the previous constitutional arrangement in making the 
legislature as constitution interpreter, the Sénat revived again in the 1852 
Constitution with a slight difference from its predecessor in its composition, but 
with the same power of constitutional adjudication, among other powers. It was 
composed of cardinals, marshals, and admirals of the Republic as well as other 
persons as the President of the Republic might wish to appoint. Similar to the 
previous arrangement, the Sénat was considered as the guardian of the 
Constitution and statutes were required to pass through its review. This 
Constitution also allowed citizens to refer their constitutional concerns on draft 
legislation to the Sénat before promulgation. Once again, the Sénat did not annul 
any law as unconstitutional73 proving further that it is not an appropriate body to 
review the constitutionality of legislation. 
The attempt made to review the constitutionality of legislation by the Sénat 
was not successful because it was under the complete political dependence of 
the Emperor and therefore “lacked the necessary institutional distance to 
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evaluate the laws”.74 The ineffectiveness of the political body to exercise review 
of constitutionality of legislation was criticized by renowned French scholars.75 
In addition to the pressures to exclude the judiciary from the law-making 
process, courts used to defer cases which involved interpretation of 
constitutions. For instance, many decisions by the Court of Cassation, like the 
case of affaire Paulin, were disposed by deference on the ground that statutes 
adopted and promulgated could not be challenged on the basis of 
unconstitutionality.76 A similar approach was followed by the Conseil d’Etat 
when it encountered the issue for the first time in 1901.77 
Hostility of the revolutionaries towards the parlements of the ancien regime 
ended up by excluding them from taking part in the law-making process and 
administrative functions. Then, the power of constitutional adjudication ended 
up with the Sénat by authorizing it as a guardian of the constitutions. Despite its 
important role of constitutional adjudicator in other jurisdictions, the Sénat did 
not entertain cases, as a result of which it was later replaced by the 
Constitutional Committee under the 1946 Constitution. 
2.1.2  The rationales 
There are some explanations why the Sénat (in France) was empowered to 
review the constitutionality of legislation from the time of the French 
Revolution up to the establishment of the Constitutional Committee under the 
1946 Constitution. These conceptions of the constitutionality review of 
legislation have influenced jurisdictions across Europe which later resorted to 
the establishment of constitutional courts. 
The first justification forwarded for not adopting judicial review of 
legislation by courts was „the theory of separation of powers underlying the 
revolutionary legislation‟.78 According to the French democratic political theory, 
judicial review would be inconsistent with the theory of separation of powers.79 
The Revolutionaries relied more on the legislature and executive as institutions 
of social transformation „to liberate the people from feudal privileges‟.80 Hence, 
„judicial functions‟ were understood to be „distinct and separate‟ from 
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legislative and administrative functions. Codification of laws guaranteeing 
individual rights and principles of equality helped to limit the role of judges.81 
 The issue of the organ that has to interpret the constitutions was a point of 
contention during the enactment of the 1946 Constitution which resulted in the 
establishment of the Constitutional Committee. The Constitutional Committee 
was empowered to decide whether legislation was in contradiction with the 
organic part of the constitution and constitutional amendment was required to 
validly enact statute.82 This arrangement, too, kept the traditional understanding 
of separation of powers by allocating review of constitutionality of legislation to 
an organ outside the judiciary.  
The second rationale behind authorizing the Sénat to review the 
constitutionality of legislation was the supremacy of laws as an expression of 
„general will‟.  
„Largely because of these abuses of the judicial function, the ideology of the 
Revolution, enshrined in the works of Rousseau and Montesquieu, stressed 
the omnipotence of statutory law, the equality of man before the law, and the 
rigid separation of powers in which the judge, the passive bouche de la loi 
(mouthpiece of the law), performed the sole task of applying the letter of the 
law to individual cases‟.83  
The legislature, as the voice of popular and national sovereignty, was seen as 
the best guarantor of fundamental rights, and ultimately of the constitutions. The 
traditional conception of separation of powers that prevailed in France since the 
Revolution and the supremacy of la loi as an expression of the „general will‟ 
were the rationales behind empowering the Sénat as an organ interpreting the 
constitutions. It was against the background of the powerful courts in the 
regimes preceding the Revolution that the Revolutionaries provided these 
reasons to exclude courts from the ambit of constitutional interpretation and 
allocated it to the Sénat. 
The institutional choices made in the subsequent constitutions of France were 
overshadowed by the past experiences of „distrust of courts‟ owing to the 
conception of separation of powers and supremacy of the law (la loi) on the one 
hand and the failures of the Sénat to properly function as constitution 
interpreter. In light of these historical incidents, the 1946 Constitution envisaged 
the power of constitutional interpretation to the Constitutional Committee. The 
framers of this Constitution had no „sense of conferring ordinary courts a power 
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of control over the constitutionality of laws‟.84 The Constitutional Committee 
was designed to be more political than the in its composition and role.85 The 
power allocated to it by the Constitution was deliberate which seemed 
incongruent with comparative experience that enables the judiciary to check 
whether the „laws voted by the National Assembly presuppose an amendment of 
the Constitution‟.86 This implies that the principles of supremacy of la loi and 
separation of powers are in tandem with the constitutional history of the France.  
The Constitutional Committee assembled only once in twelve years which 
led to the establishment of the Conseil Constitutionnel, also known as the 
Constitutional Council, under the 1958 Constitution. The principal reason for 
the establishment of the Constitutional Council was „to prevent Parliament from 
legislating outside of the matters which were assigned to it‟87 by the 
Constitution. Ousted from the task of interpreting a constitution for historical 
reasons, the French judiciary was not once again a choice for the framers of the 
1958 Constitution.  
The changes in the institutional choices made to discharge the task of 
constitutional review in the constitutions of France resulted in the failure of the 
Sénat to adjudicate constitutional disputes. The practical failures of the Sénat 
coupled with the historical incidents that shaped the constitutional history of 
France directed the framers to come up with an institutional choice that came to 
be „uniquely French‟.88  
2.2 Brazil under the 1824 monarchical constitution 
Brazil‟s Imperial Constitution of 1824 was enacted upon independence from 
Portuguese colonization. The Constitution established „a monarchic, inherited, 
constitutional and representative government‟.89 The constitutional arrangement 
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relating to constitutional adjudication under the 1824 Constitution of Brazil and 
the rationales for such choice are highlighted below. 
2.2.1 The General Assembly as interpreter of the Constitution 
With respect to its making process, the Emperor rejected proposals of a 
„Constitutional Convention‟ and called a group of prominent figures „a State 
Council‟ and enacted a text drawn up by them.12 Although it was not the fruit of 
social pressures or a democratic conquest, it was a rather liberal charter.90 The 
Emperor had a significant role in the lawmaking process and influenced the 
content of the constitution which granted him a wider political power. The 
Constitution was in force until 1889. 
According to Article 10 of the Constitution, political power was comprised 
of „legislative, „moderating‟91, executive and judicial powers‟.92 Legislative 
power was allocated to the General Assembly which was composed of two 
bodies: The Chambers of Deputies and the Senate.93 One of the functions of the 
General Assembly listed under Article 15 of the Constitution was „to watch over 
the Constitution and to promote the wellbeing of the nation‟. It also had the 
power to make, to interpret, to suspend and to repeal laws.94 This arrangement 
was similar with that of France's constitutional history discussed above except 
for the fact that the General Assembly of Brazil under 1824 Constitution was 
composed of both chambers. 
These constitutional texts clearly granted the power to interpret the 
Constitution to the legislative organ, the General Assembly. Such an 
arrangement was made due to the dominating role of the Emperor, who had a 
unique „moderating power‟ which allowed him to control all other organs of 
government. The Emperor was described as „supreme chief of the nation‟ and 
was empowered to „incessantly watch over the maintenance of independence, 
the equilibrium and harmony of the other political powers‟.95 
The „moderating‟ power of the Emperor included nominating Senators, 
convoking extraordinary General Assemblies, sanctioning the decrees and 
resolutions of the General Assembly and giving them the force of laws, and 
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dissolving the Chamber of Deputies.96 The Emperor was the chief of the 
executive and exercised this power through his Ministers of State.97 All these 
powers of the Emperor remained unchecked because the General Assembly –an 
entity supposed to keep the supremacy of the Constitution– was under the 
control of the Emperor.  
2.2.2 The rationales 
The creation of the „moderating‟ power of the Emperor may be explained by the 
fact that the issue of national unity along with new institutions after 
independence had to be handled by the centralizing power of the Emperor.98 
This power of the Emperor helped him to limit powers of the local and regional 
government which were deemed to be a threat to national unity.99 If stronger 
constitutional review mechanisms were envisaged in the Constitution, it may 
have, supposedly, hampered the Emperor's exercise of power.  
The 1891 Constitution, which established the First Republic, was largely 
taken from the Constitution of the United States. It established a federal 
presidential system, separation of powers, checks and balances, and institutions. 
The period of monopoly of power by the Emperor came to an end with this 
Constitution. The provinces were given the status of sub-units and power was 
allocated between the two levels of government.  
The empowerment of the legislatures in both France and Brazil as 
constitutional adjudicator was justified by pragmatic considerations: France‟s 
difficulty of having powerful courts which led to their exclusion from reviewing 
legislation and administrative action on the grounds of separation of powers and 
supremacy of la loi, and Brazil‟s justification of establishing strong central 
government to keep the country unified against the interests of strong provinces. 
However, the difference lies in the degree of influence in the subsequent 
constitutions. In France, the influence of the ideals of the revolutionaries on 
separation of powers and supremacy of la loi remained deeply rooted in the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the country whereas it ceased to exist in Brazil as 
early as 1891. 
The role of the judiciary in constitutional adjudication was secondary during 
the pre-republican period of the imperial regime in Brazil. Under the 1891 
Constitution, the role of interpreting the Constitution was granted to the 
Supreme Court. The 1891 Constitution introduced judicial review „which 
expressly authorized the judiciary to review all matters, laws and executive 
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orders, for consistency with the constitution‟.100 Since then, the Supreme Court 
of Brazil interprets constitutions which were changed several times.  
2.3 Ineffective constitutional adjudication in France (Pre-1946) and 
Brazil (Pre-1891)  
The history of France and Brazil discussed above indicates that constitutional 
adjudication by parliaments was not functional. In France, parlements were 
excluded from the ambit of „legislative power‟ owing to their pre-revolution 
dominant roles. The main rationales for empowering the Sénat were supremacy 
of la loi and separation of powers. The failure of the Sénat, however, indicates 
that parliaments are not appropriate bodies to adjudicate constitutional issues. In 
addition, „a political organ with effective powers of constitutional review and 
the requisite independence would have been too powerful, displacing the 
Government itself.‟101 Subsequent changes that were brought to this 
arrangement took into account these same rationales, but with the belief that 
stronger checks on the constitutionality of laws and executive actions were 
necessary.  
The case in Brazil was different in that the Emperor consolidated his power 
of dominating all branches of government with a view to centralizing political 
power. The threat to the central government came from the provinces and the 
Emperor had concentrated power to limit powers of the regional and local 
governments and defend the unity if the country. Stronger form of judicial 
review mechanism was not thus desired.   
Both constitutional arrangements were in force for more than 150 years in 
France and for more than 60 years in Brazil. However, both legislatures were 
not effective in constitutional adjudication. Eventually, these jurisdictions 
resorted to granting constitutional adjudication to a different body: France first 
to Constitutional Committee then to Conseil Constitutionnel and Brazil to the 
Supreme Court.  
3. Constitutional Adjudication by National People’s Congress in 
China  
The current institutional choice for constitutional adjudication in China was 
heavily shaped by the arrangements in the constitutions preceding it. There were 
four written constitutions in the constitutional history of China. This section 
briefly discusses the constitutional history preceding the 1982 Constitution and 
looks into the powers of the constitutional supervision and interpretation by the 
NPC and NCPCSC.  
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3.1 Constitutional adjudication in China since 1954 
Chinese constitutional history after the fall of feudal monarchy in 1911 is 
explained by struggles between traditional Confucian ideas, western 
constitutionalism and communism. Four written constitutions were enacted 
since the 1950s, all of which were characterized as typical examples of 
constitutions without constitutionalism.102  
In 1949, the Political Consultative Committee was established which was 
composed of political parties and associations mostly dominated by the 
Communist Party of China (hereinafter the „CCP‟).103 The Consultative 
Committee adopted provisional Common Programme which laid down new 
principles for all subsequent constitutions.104 This document proclaimed a 
„people's democratic dictatorship‟ to refer to “power based on a „united front‟ 
made up of classes of workers, peasants, petty and national bourgeois”.105 The 
Common Programme influenced constitutions enacted afterwards. The Preamble 
of the 1954 Constitution states that it was enacted „based on the Common 
Programme of the Chinese People‟s Political Consultative Conference of 1949 
and is a development of it”.106 The current Constitution has taken various 
institutional arrangements including constitutional adjudication from the 1954 
Constitution.  
The first written socialist constitution, which was a prototype for the current 
Constitution, was enacted in 1954. Among other things, the 1954 Constitution 
had established NPC and NPCSC, the State President, the State Council, and 
Local People's Congress (LPC), and it has the same structure with the current 
Constitution. However, the 1954 Constitution „was not implemented with 
serious effort and [it did not] curb calamities of massive scale caused by abuse 
of state power”, thereby causing subsequent constitutional and political changes 
that affected the contemporary China.107 Article 27 of the Constitution 
empowered the NPC to „supervise the Constitution‟. As there were no 
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provisions under the Constitution that deal with constitutional interpretation, it 
could be assumed that the NPC was intended to exercise this power too.108 
The rationale behind such an arrangement comes initially from the 1949 
Common Programme which required „democratic centralism‟ under the 
dominance of the Communist Party of China. Democratic centralism in the 
Soviet Union and later in China meant decision-making process adopted by the 
Communist Party which combined two seemingly opposing ideas of democracy 
and central control.109 Accordingly, all powers belong to the NPC ultimately and 
to local people's congress at the lower level where decisions should be made 
collectively (and at times with unanimity). It would be incompatible with the 
ideas held by the Communist Party if the power to control the NPC and the 
government through constitutional review was granted to an impartial body. 
Weak constitutional review mechanism was chosen against this background and 
continued to be adopted by subsequent constitutions.  
Empowerment of the NPC as constitutional adjudicator also relates to the 
conception of supremacy of the legislature in socialist/communist states as a 
reflection of sovereignty of the people. Socialist legal systems reject the 
conception of separation of powers by making the legislature the highest 
authority of the government; and even if they allocate powers to the three organs 
of government, these organs have never been equal.110 Legislative supremacy 
rather than empowered judiciary was “recognized as fundamental premise of the 
socialist ideology”.111  
A similar hostile attitude of French revolutionaries towards the exercise of 
constitutionality review by courts could be observed in the case of China. The 
legislative organ was empowered to check constitutionality of state actions as a 
consequence of its supremacy and “constitutionality review could not be 
exercised by extra-parliamentary bodies”.112 Hence, in the case of China, 
distrust of courts comes from the supremacy of the NPC and its legislations 
whereas in France, it emerged as a reaction against the powerful courts that 
existed in the ancien regime. This conception of supremacy of the NPC and its 
legislation over other organs of the government has shaped the constitutional 
law of China and its institutional choice of constitutional adjudication. 
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Separation of powers was rejected in the case of China as the NPC was/is 
supreme. Courts were/are thus excluded from constitutionality review. In 
France, however, separation of powers was the basis for the French 
revolutionaries to exclude courts from interfering in the functions of the 
legislature and executive. The same concept, i.e. separation of powers, which 
was rejected in one and strictly construed in another, was the basis to exclude 
courts from the ambit of constitutional review.   
During the reign of Mao Zedong, there were many measures that violated the 
constitution. This situation continued during the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976).113 Then, the NPC convened and enacted the 1975 Constitution and 
primarily reduced human rights provisions from the previous constitution and 
abolished procedural safeguards. It added the right to strike and other rights to 
carryout socialist revolution.114 This Constitution „conflated the party and state 
functionaries and dramatically enhanced the role of the CPC.115 The 1975 
Constitution did not provide any institutional mechanism for constitutional 
interpretation. It was rather a very simplistic articulation of the NPC116 with few 
constitutional provisions.  
A third Constitution was enacted in 1978 following Mao Zedong's death. 
This Constitution made some changes, but it was regarded as a continuation of 
the social revolution: it deleted some of the leftist provisions and added human 
rights provisions, and “set the Four Modernizations in industry, agriculture, 
defence, science and technology”.117 This Constitution was a re-establishment of 
the 1954 Constitution with a view to rebuild the political system of the 1950s 
which was destroyed by the Cultural Revolution.118 Hence, the power of the 
NPC to supervise the Constitution was restored. NPCSC was granted the power 
to take part in constitutional interpretation.119 This Constitution was revised 
twice subsequently before it was replaced by a new constitution in 1982.  
Regarding the institutional choices for constitutional adjudication, a similar 
trend of empowering the NPC continued through the constitutions which were 
influenced by the communist ideology and the CPC.  
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3.2 Constitutional adjudication under the 1982 Constitution 
The 1982 Constitution was „necessitated by economic reforms initiated in 
December 1978‟ which signified an attempt to embrace free market in socialist 
state, a project which was started by its predecessors.120 It was in fact an attempt 
to restore pre-Cultural Revolution constitutional system as radical measures 
taken by revolutionary leaders have destroyed it. The constitution was 
conservative with respect to its resemblance to its remote predecessor, the 1954 
constitution, while the societal contexts were different.121 Hence, NPCSC‟s 
power to interpret the Constitution was not an invention of the 1982 
Constitution, but it was taken from the 1954 Constitution. Proposals to establish 
a constitutional court by the Constitution Revision Committee was rejected by 
its own influential members as „not necessary‟.122 
As Jones observes, there are some „unusual characteristics‟ in China‟s 1982 
Constitution even if it is „recognizable to Westerners‟ that it has some features 
from their constitutions and also embodies some features from the Soviet 
Constitution.123 One of these unusual features is the NPC, which is not directly 
elected by the people, but by a local congress elected by citizens.124 According 
to Article 57 and 58 of the Constitution, the NPC is the highest organ and 
exercises the legislative power of the state. The NPC could seldom be 
considered as parliament owing to its big size with more than 3,000 (three 
thousand) members, and it meets once a year to initiate legislation.125  
Some of the powers of the NPC, as listed under Article 62, include amending 
the Constitution, supervising the enforcement of the Constitution, enacting 
legislation, electing the President and the Premier, appointing the President of 
the Supreme People's Court and the Procurator-General of the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate. Even if the NPC has extensive powers under the Constitution, it 
is considered by many scholars as „rubber stamp‟ to the Communist Party as it 
was translating the policies of the party into legislation.126 
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The NPC is composed of deputies elected, for the term of five years, from 
the „provinces, autonomous regions, municipalities directly under the Central 
Government, and the special administrative regions, and of deputies elected 
from the armed forces‟.127 Minority nationals have also special representations 
in the NPC. The Constitution does not fix the total number of seats of the NPC, 
and it rather grows as prescribed by law.  
The NPC meets annually, and its routine activities are undertaken by its 
permanent body, the Standing Committee which is composed of the Chairman, 
the Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary-General and Members.128 The NPCSC has the 
same term of office with the NPC whereas the Chairman and Vice-Chairman 
many not serve for more than two consecutive terms. The NPCSC is responsible 
and reports to the NPC which may recall and question them.129 Article 67, inter 
alia, recognizes the powers of the NPCSC to interpret the Constitution and 
supervise its enforcement, enact and amend statutes that do not fall under 
powers of the NPC, enact and amend statutes when the NPC is not in session, 
and to interpret the statutes.  
Under Article 62 (2) of the Constitution, the NPC has the power to supervise 
the enforcement of the Constitution while Article 67(1) states the powers of the 
NPCSC to interpret the Constitution and supervise its enforcement. The 1982 
Constitution provides for constitutional review on two grounds. One is 
Paragraph 12 of the Preamble which clearly declares that the Constitution is “the 
fundamental law of the state and has supreme legal authority” which has to be 
observed and obeyed by “the people of all nationalities, all state organs, the 
armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises 
and undertakings in the country”.130 The second ground is Article 5 which 
provides that the Constitution binds all acts of the government entities and no 
law or regulation may contravene it. The powers of the two organs supervising 
and interpreting the Constitution emanates from these two constitutional 
grounds. 
The Constitution does not define constitutional supervision or constitutional 
interpretation. The issue would then be whether these two expressions are 
interchangeable. Dingjian considers constitutional supervision as an all-
encompassing phrase that may include „examining, preventing, correcting and 
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punishing acts‟ that are found to be unconstitutional.131 This indicates that 
constitutional supervision may involve reviewing the constitutionality of laws 
and actions with its own initiative when it finds necessary. The powers of the 
NPCSC are limited to interpreting the constitution which refers to entertaining 
concrete cases. Apart from NPCSC‟s accountability and its duty to report to the 
NPC, the latter may alter decisions of the former.  
The NPC exercises its power of constitutional supervision through what is 
often called „legislation supervision‟. It supervises and controls legislation and 
regulations enacted hierarchically from local people's congress to its own laws.  
The Law of Legislation provides that review of constitutionality is conducted by 
the NPC and the NPCSC and review of legality is undertaken by the State 
Council.132 
Regarding the scope of powers of constitutional supervision, there are 
debates whether the NPC could exercise its power of constitutional control 
against the CPC.133 Some argue that the Preamble and Article 5 of the 
Constitution clearly obliges political parties to obey the Constitution, whereas, 
there are also skeptic views because the CPC controls the NPC in many ways.134 
A compromise between these views is that the NPC may exercise constitutional 
supervision but is limited to documents and it can suggest modifications if it 
finds it to be unconstitutional.135 
Some cases have been brought before the NPC which tested the 
constitutional review system and procedures of submitting cases especially since 
the Qi Yuling Case.136 In this case, the Supreme People‟s Court issued a reply to 
the lower court‟s submission on how to apply the laws which explicitly 
recognized that the infringement of constitutional right to education entails civil 
liabilities. Many scholars supported the decision on the ground that 
„constitutional judicialization‟ was getting root in China and fundamental rights 
recognized by the Constitution could be enforced against the government 
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through courts.137 However, the reply was later in 2008 abolished by the Court 
itself without mentioning any reason.138 
In some other instances, courts were kept distant from the ambit of 
constitutional interpretation even to the extent of not mentioning a constitutional 
provision in their judgments. Ordinary courts cannot decide on the inconsistency 
of legal norms of different hierarchy, for instance between local rule enacted by 
the local people's congress and the legislation enacted by the NPC.139 This has 
weakened the role of courts with respect to the enforcement of human rights.140 
The same point applies to Ethiopia, as discussed in Section 4.  
The issue of who could submit constitutional complaints has never been clear 
as the system of constitutional review was dormant for a long time. The NPCSC 
was also reluctant to resolve such constitutional disputes submitted to it in a 
direct way as a means of checks and balance. Rather, it resorts to political 
options of convincing the concerned organs to change their regulations.141 This 
indicates the failure of the NPCSC to adjudicate constitutional issues.  
Different reasons have been forwarded by scholars for the failure of the 
NPCSC to exercise its power of constitutional review. The first reason relates to 
the task of constitutional supervision as an additional power to the organ with 
inherent legislative power. The NPC and NPCSC are among “the busiest 
legislatures in the world for enacting laws”142 and they barely have time for 
constitutional review. Secondly, instead of checks and balance, per se, 
cooperation prevails among organs of the government which results in the use of 
political lines143 rather than adjudication. Thirdly, owing to the traditional 
political culture, NPC shows „respect to other political organs‟.144 These and 
other reasons have contributed for the weak exercise of an already weak 
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constitutional review mechanism. Chinese constitutional review system is not 
thus effective.  
Unlike the constitutional system of Mainland China, the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region (hereinafter Hong Kong SAR) has a different design for 
constitutional adjudication. The Basic Law of Hong Kong SAR was enacted by 
NPC as part of its commitment to the Sino-Joint Declaration.145 Accordingly, 
the Basic Law recognizes that Hong Kong remains to be capitalist for 50 years 
thereby, enabling it to, inter alia, pursue a slightly different constitutional review 
mechanism based on the notion of „One Country, Two Systems‟.146 
Basically, the NPCSC is empowered to interpret the Basic Law whereas 
courts of Hong Kong SAR are entitled to interpret the Basic Law in the course 
of adjudicating cases reserving the power to interpret provisions of the Basic 
Law relating to the powers of the Central People's Government and relationship 
between the two governments.147 This is a significant departure from the power 
of courts in Mainland China.  
The Hong Kong SAR, as an autonomous territory within PRC, has a separate 
court structure from Mainland China. The Court of Final Appeals retains the 
power to entertain cases based on the Basic Law. It has been seen in practice 
that there have been debates on the constitutional jurisdictions of Hong Kong 
SAR courts and that of the NPC where the Court of Final Appeals passed 
decisions in some cases that the NPCSC found as intruding its power of 
constitutional supervision.148 
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4. Constitutional Adjudication by (non-)Legislative Parliament 
in Ethiopia: House of Federation  
Ethiopia‟s Monarchical Constitutions of 1931 and 1955, the 1987 PDRE 
(People‟s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) Constitution and the 1995 
FDRE (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) Constitution bear various 
features with regard to constitutional interpretation. The 1931 Constitution 
(enacted upon the coronation of Emperor Haile Selassie) had no supremacy 
clause while the 1955 Revised Constitution had a provision which declared the 
Constitution to be supreme; but no organ was empowered to ensure 
supremacy.149  
The 1987 Constitution declared that it is the supreme law of the land and the 
National Shengo, a legislative organ, was empowered to „supervise the 
observance the Constitution‟.150 This arrangement resembles the Chinese 
constitutional choice of the NPC as it recognized the National Shengo as the 
highest legislative body just like the NPC. It was expected to meet once a year 
and its routine activities were undertaken by the State Council, an institution 
similar to the NPCSC. The regime's allegiance to the socialist ideology and its 
strong relation with the Soviet Union influenced its choices of institutions. The 
1987 Constitution was, however, suspended in 1991 by the ethno-nationalist 
movements who overthrew the regime which made the Constitution short-
lived.151 As a result, the Constitution was not tested in practice and it is difficult 
to make comparison with its Chinese counterpart regardless of its similarity in 
its design.  
The 1995 Constitution takes diversity strongly as a response to Ethiopia‟s 
immediate history, and it makes identity and language as a basis of granting 
autonomy. It starts from its Preamble which says, „We the Nations, Nationalities 
and Peoples of Ethiopia‟ by recognizing that Ethiopia is composed of different 
ethnic groups. The Constitution also makes the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples its authors and declares that the federation is established by their „free‟ 
agreement.152 Sovereign political power resides in them. The basis of the federal 
system is predominantly ethnic and each group is entitled to establish its own 
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state.153 The right to promote their culture, language and history, establish self-
governments and being represented in the federal and state governments are also 
recognized under Article 39 of the Constitution. 
4.1 Constitutional adjudication under the 1995 Constitution  
Article 62 of the 1995 Constitution grants power to interpret the Constitution to 
the House of Federation, a second chamber composed of representatives of 
ethnic groups. Such a unique arrangement was justified by the framers on the 
ground that the Constitution belongs to the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
and they should be the one who should have final say on it.154 Despite the 
criticisms in academic and political discourse, the arrangement has not been 
changed.  
The HoF is one of the institutions that reflect the accommodative nature of 
the Constitution in its composition and powers entrusted to it. In addition to 
interpreting the Constitution, the HoF has powers in deciding on issues, inter 
alia, relating to self-determination, promoting equality and unity, solving 
disputes among states, dividing revenues collected from concurrent powers of 
taxation and subsidies, and ordering federal intervention in the states.155 
The HoF is assisted by a technical body, called Council of Constitutional 
Inquiry (CCI), composed of the President and Vice President of the Federal 
Supreme Court, six legal experts appointed by the President of the Country 
(Head of State) and three representatives of the HoF.156 Membership of the 
President and Vice President of Federal Supreme Court as President and Vice 
President of the CCI is automatic, and ipso facto, they lead the CCI. 
There are debates on the scope of the power of the HoF to review 
constitutionality of laws, regulations and decisions of government organs. Some 
scholars argue that the power of the HoF is limited to reviewing constitutionality 
of legislation enacted by the federal parliament and state legislatures, leaving 
constitutionality of laws enacted by the executive at all levels and decisions of 
government organs to be reviewed by ordinary courts.157 Others argue that the 
HoF has exclusive power to review the constitutionality of all acts of organs of 
the government on the ground that the framers had no intention of sharing this 
between the HoF and the judiciary.158 These debates are not merely theoretical 
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in that they are creating practical problems. Some judges prefer to refer cases to 
the HoF/CCI when they think that it involves an issue of constitutionality or 
upon fear of political pressure whereas others adjudicate cases which seem 
constitutional adjudication per se.159 
Proclamations No. 251/2001160 and 798/2013161 provide that a case may be 
submitted either to the HoF, which refers the case to the CCI or to the CCI 
directly. As it could be understood from Article 84(2) of the Constitution, the 
CCI investigates the case and if it is convinced that there is violation of the 
Constitution, then it forwards its recommendation to the HoF for final decision. 
The HoF, then, undertakes its own investigation based on the recommendation 
of the CCI, and it reaches at its own decision. In practice, the HoF barely 
reaches at a different conclusion than the CCI which makes the CCI an 
important institution in the process of constitutional adjudication in Ethiopia. 
4.2 The rationale for empowering the HoF as constitutional adjudicator 
The HoF is the representative of NNPs entrusted with the task of interpreting the 
Constitution in addition to its role as a non-legislative second chamber. In the 
case of China, the NPC is the legislative assembly which has the highest state 
authority whereas the HoF is a non-legislative second chamber. The HoF has no 
legislative power even if there are some powers, which are not legislative, that it 
may jointly exercise with the House of People's Representatives.   
The issues of who should interpret the Constitution and the respective roles 
of the HoF and ordinary courts have been subject to discourse among scholars 
during the lawmaking process and thereafter.162 The framers of the Constitution 
justified allocating the power of constitutional interpretation to the HoF on the 
ground that the Constitution is „a political contract among the NNPs‟ and hence 
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the NNPs should, through their representatives, have final say on what the 
Constitution says.163  
The HoF was chosen among other proposals such as ordinary courts and 
constitutional courts.164 The proposal for authorizing courts of any kind was 
rejected by the framers on two grounds. First, the framers believed that judges 
would not be neutral from prevailing thoughts in the society and they would 
erode rights of NNPs under the guise of interpretation.165 Secondly, the framers 
argued that judges cannot be above the people because the NNPs, through their 
representatives should have power to interpret the Constitution which they have 
formulated, and they are accorded with the rights and interests in the 
Constitution.166 This suggests that the judiciary was deliberately excluded from 
interpreting the Constitution for the fear that it may go against the rights of 
NNPs. 
The idea of sharing the power of constitutional interpretation between the 
HoF and the judiciary was also raised in the Constituent Assembly. It was 
suggested that courts could interpret fundamental human rights provisions and 
the HoF can reserve the power to interpret those provisions relating to the rights 
of NNPs. However, it was rejected by the majority of members of the Assembly 
on the ground that this would not prevent courts from eroding rights of NNPs 
and it would be difficult to categorize constitutional provisions in this 
manner.167 Therefore, the framers had the intention of granting the power to 
interpret the Constitution exclusively to the HoF with a view to protect rights of 
NNPs as authors of the Constitution.  
This rationale of the framers of the Constitution may be compared with that 
of the French revolutionaries who also rejected courts as interpreters of the 
constitutions. The framers of the Ethiopian Constitution had the intention of 
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protecting rights of NNPs and enabling them to have the final say on what the 
Constitution wants to convey as authors, whereas the French revolutionaries 
responded against the powerful courts of the ancien regime based on the 
conception of separation of powers and supremacy of la loi. Although the 
rationale and contexts are different, their view towards courts is the same in that 
both did not trust ordinary courts.   
A similar conclusion may be reached in the cases of Brazil and China. In 
Brazil, the idea of having a strong central government with powerful Emperor 
was the main reason for empowering the legislature as constitutional adjudicator 
implicitly indicating that courts would constrain powers of the Emperor. 
Likewise, the Chinese Constitution focused on empowering the CPC, as a party 
leading the country and in light of its allegiance to communist ideology.  
Many critics have argued against such an arrangement stating that the HoF is 
inefficient and is not an impartial body. The reasons relate to the structure and 
composition of the HoF. Election processes, powers and decision making 
procedures show that it is a political body and hence not an impartial organ to 
adjudicate constitutional issues. The HoF is structurally an upper chamber of the 
federal government which is composed of one representative of all NNPs and 
one additional member for each one million additional population.168 It has no 
fixed number of seats as its composition depends partly on the population size 
of NNPs. For instance, the number of seats during the 2010-2014 term was 
135.169 The number of NNPs represented also varies through time due to seats 
allocated to new ethnic groups admitted to it based on the requirements under 
Article 39(5) of the Constitution.170 Even if it seems logical that the NNPs (as 
authors) should interpret the Constitution, HoF does not have institutional 
independence. 
Regarding the mode of election, the members of the HoF may either be 
directly elected by the people or indirectly by the state legislatures. In practice, 
the NNPs have never been elected representatives to the HoF. Rather, the State 
Council of each regional state sends representatives from the state executives. 
The manner of election both under the Constitution and in practice proves the 
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political nature of the institution. This practice is similar with that of the NPC of 
China as their members are not directly elected by the people.  
The decision-making process of the HoF creates further difficulty in 
constitutional adjudication. According to Article 14 of Proclamation No. 
251/2001, decisions of the HoF –on cases that involve constitutional 
interpretation– „may‟ be rendered by a unanimous vote of the members who are 
present. The meaning of the word „may‟ is not clear whether it can be 
interpreted as mandatory, or whether the discretion of choice in deciding based 
on unanimous vote is given to the HoF. Moreover, the issue of who oversees the 
exercise of powers of the HoF171 is relevant. Obviously, the CCI, as an advisory 
body, cannot check the constitutionality of decisions of the HoF. In some 
jurisdictions, constitutional courts exercise powers (in addition to constitutional 
adjudication), and such powers include supervising election, referendum, and 
controlling political parties. Decisions passed by the constitutional courts on 
these matters remain final.  
However, the powers of the HoF are not similar with that of constitutional 
courts as some of them have regulatory features. For example, if a particular 
group alleges that they fulfil requirements of Article 39(5) and claim recognition 
as NNP and rights thereof, then the final and non-appealable decision rests on 
the HoF.172 Another example could be the decision that the HoF passes on the 
division of revenues collected from the concurrent powers of taxation of the two 
levels of government. If a constitutional adjudicator has power which is 
administrative in character other than constitutional interpretation, then the 
power remains unchecked. These are theoretical concerns which show the 
inappropriateness of the HoF as constitutional adjudicator. There are also 
practical reasons, discussed below, which show gaps in HoF‟s operations as an 
impartial and strong constitutional adjudicator.  
                                           
171
 In practice, the EPRDF and its affiliates control all the nine regional states, and state 
councils of each regional state sends representatives from state executive. This shows 
that the members of the HoF are in practice politicians from the state executive.  
172
 The Case of Kontoma Community who lives in the Guraghe Zone of Southern Nations, 
Nationalities and People's regional state (SNNPRS) recently claimed that they have 
distinct identity that qualifies the requirements under the Constitution and they are 
suffering from discrimination from other ethnic groups. After undertaking a research on 
the issue, both the SNNPRS and the HoF decided that the group does not fulfil the 
requirements under the Constitution. The representatives of the Community brought a 
constitutional complaint to the Council of Constitutional Inquiry against the decision of 
the HoF alleging that their constitutional right has been violated. The Council, in its 
latest session, stated that it has no power to review the constitutionality of decisions of 
the HoF.  
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4.3 The role of the Council of Constitutional Inquiry 
The CCI is the advisory body for the HoF in its task of constitutional 
interpretation. As it has been mentioned above, it is chaired by the President and 
the Vice President of the Federal Supreme Court as President (Chairperson) and 
Vice President (Vice Chairperson), six legal experts to be appointed by the 
President of the country upon recommendation by the Parliament, and three 
representatives of the House of Federation.173 In general, out of its eleven 
members, at least eight are legal experts while there is no such requirement for 
members assigned by the HoF. The composition of the CCI makes it a technical 
body that assists the HoF. 
In China and Ethiopia, the assemblies interpreting the constitutions are 
respectively assisted by the Standing Committee of NPC and the CCI of the 
HoF. However, the CCI is different in structure, composition and powers from 
the NPCSC of China. First, unlike the NPCSC, the CCI is not an organ that 
operates as permanent body of the HoF. It is rather an advisory body 
empowered „to investigate constitutional disputes‟ and make recommendations 
to the HoF if it finds that interpretation of the Constitution is necessary.174 
Hence, the CCI does not take part in other functions of the HoF than 
constitutional interpretation. 
Secondly, its composition is different from the NPCSC. The latter is 
composed of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairmen, the Secretary-General and 
Members of the NPC, who may not be lawyers, whereas the CCI, as mentioned 
above, is mainly composed of lawyers. The composition of these organs 
indicates the purposes for which these entities are created: NPCSC is created as 
permanent body of the NPC whereas the CCI is created to technically support 
the HoF in constitutional interpretation.  
With regard to the procedures of complaint, Proclamation No. 798/2013 
clearly indicates who could bring cases to the HoF/CCI.175 According to Article 
4 of this Proclamation, any interested party who claims constitutional violation 
by a legislation, regulation or administrative decision may apply to the HoF/CCI 
for review of constitutionality if it has exhausted local remedies. If the case is 
justiciable, courts should refer the constitutional issue to the CCI either upon 
request by the parties to the case or the court‟s own initiative. When compared 
                                           
173
 Article 82 of the Constitution of FDRE. The earlier draft of this Article had suggested 6 
members to be elected by the HoF whereas legal experts appointed by the President of 
the Republic were three. It was changed into the current composition with a view to 
strengthen the technical support that the CCI is expected to give to the HoF. See Minutes 
of the Constituent Assembly, Vol. 5, p. 1.  
174
 Article 84 of the Constitution of the FDRE. 
175
 When the HoF receives complaints, it refers it to the CCI for recommendation. 
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with China, there are indeed clear provisions regarding who could bring cases to 
the HoF/CCI.  
The CCI is a key institution in constitutional adjudication, and most 
recommendations of the CCI are accepted by the HoF even if there are some 
cases where the latter departed from the opinion of the CCI and passed its own 
decision.176 There are some constraints that hinder the CCI from playing its part 
towards the enhancement of constitutionalism in Ethiopia. First, the Constitution 
establishes the CCI under Article 82 (in the section that deals with the judiciary) 
which is silent about CCI‟s autonomy. Even if it is an advisory body, genuine 
autonomy would enable the CCI to proactively engage in constitutional 
adjudication and show to what extent the organs of the government are 
observing the Constitution. This active role would put pressure on the political 
bodies to observe the Constitution as recommendations of the CCI would make 
them vulnerable politically. Article 62(2) of the Constitution provides that the 
HoF has the power to organize the CCI. It is not clear how far this power to 
„organize‟ could go, and hence leaves the door open for the HoF to control, and 
even give instruction to the CCI. Clear indication of the independence and 
autonomy of the CCI under the Constitution would have enabled it to play a 
much better role.  
Secondly, the limited frequency of meetings of the CCI, i.e., at least once a 
month,177 adversely affects its performance. A separate secretariat has been 
established by Proclamation No. 798/2013 due to the growing volume of cases 
submitted to the HoF. Although Article 83 of the Constitution requires the HoF 
to decide a constitutional dispute within thirty (30) days, the steadily growing 
number of complaints takes more time to render decisions than the timeframe 
stated in the Constitution. Thirdly, there is no requirement, under the 
Constitution that demands the political neutrality of the legal experts appointed 
by the President of the Republic. This opens the door for stronger political 
influence on the CCI as the Parliament recommends politically affiliated legal 
experts.  
4.4 Practical implications 
It has been more than two decades since the 1995 Constitution of Ethiopia is 
enacted. This period is long enough to enable us examine whether the 
arrangement on constitutional adjudication is achieving its purposes. The 
                                           
176
 The Benishangul Gumuz Case could be mentioned as an example where the HoF took its 
own position. See Benishangul Gumuz Case, Journal of Constitutional Decisions, The 
House of Federation of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, July 2008, Vol. 1. 
177
 Article 23 of Proclamation No. 798/2013. 
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practices of the HoF/CCI should thus be examined in light of the aspirations and 
pledges of the framers.178 
Since the enactment of the 1995 Constitution, more than 2,900 (two thousand 
nine hundred) cases were filed (until February 2018) in the CCI for review of 
constitutionality, and most of the cases were individual complaints brought 
against judicial decisions.179 This number looks larger when it is compared with 
the Chinese counterpart or with France‟s Sénat or Brazil‟s Assembly. Among 
these cases, it is only in 24 cases180 that the CCI found legislation and acts of 
government organs unconstitutional.181 Most of the cases where the HOF/CCI 
decided unconstitutionality are individual complaints brought to them mostly 
against judicial decisions.   
Among the cases adjudicated by the HoF/CCI, since their establishment 
under the Constitution, only few cases were related to rights of NNPs, and it was 
in one case that the CCI/HoF found unconstitutionality in its review.182 
Recently, the growing number of claims relating to the rights of NNPs indicates 
the growing ethnic consciousness among groups. 
This practical evidence thus substantiates the flaws in the design on 
constitutional adjudication thereby disproving the framers‟ fear because issues 
relating to nationalities have (since 1995) come to the scene of constitutional 
interpretation very rarely. Surprisingly, the organ that passes decisions on issues 
relating to identity and exercise of rights of NNPs is the HoF. Ordinary courts 
cannot entertain such cases on the ground that they are not justiciable even in 
the absence of a restriction to interpret the Constitution. As it was mentioned in 
the dissenting opinion among the members of the Constituent Assembly, it 
                                           
178
 The data is obtained from annual reports of the CCI as the decisions of both the HoF and 
the CCI are not available on their website or publication except the first four landmark 
cases which are published. 
179
 This number was found from anonymous source working in the Secretariat of the CCI.  
180
 Ibid. Most of these cases were decided after the CCI got its secretariat separate from the 
HoF in 2013.  
181
 Most legislation (the constitutionality of which was challenged like anti terrorism 
legislation, broadcast and media legislation, Regulation of emlpoyees of Revenue and 
customs authority) were found to be constitutional despite their clear contradiction with 
the Constitution.    
182
 See the Silte Case, Journal of Constitutional Decisions, The House of Federation of the 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, July 2008, Volume 1, pp. 40-100; The Case of 
Benishangul Gumuz could also be mentioned as an example. Recently, questions of the 
People of Qimant, Welkaite and Kontoma Community may be added to the list. See 
Ruling of  House  of  Federation, on  4th Parliamentary  Term, 5th Year,  2nd Regular  
Meeting,  24th June  2015, Unpublished; Decision of Council of Constitutional Inquiry, 
File No. 1459/2015, 22 June 2016, unpublished. 
68                              MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 12, No.1                             September 2018 
 
 
would have been better if the HoF had been empowered to interpret the 
Constitution only in cases involving rights of NNPs. Such an arrangement 
would have been adequate to protect rights of NNPs, on the one hand, and 
meanwhile ensure stronger judicial review. The framers‟ fear of what they 
called „constitutional crises‟ would not have been a threat to constitutionalism as 
much as designing such weak constitutional review mechanism. 
In the Ethiopian context, issues of violations of fundamental rights –rather 
than rights of NNPs– are the most frequently lodged constitutional complaints. 
Strengthening schemes of check and balance through review of constitutionality 
is among the measures that restore peace and create a stable democracy. Given 
the fact that people in many parts of Ethiopia, particularly in Oromia and 
Amhara Regional States, protested183 in the quest for better protection of human 
rights, lack of good governance and equality verifies this point. Hence, the facts 
on the ground verify that the issue of stronger constitutional review in Ethiopia 
is expedient, and that the framers of the 1995 Constitution have unduly 
exaggerated the potential violation of rights of NNPs. Mere focus on collective 
rights such as rights of NNPs becomes futile unless individual rights are 
simultaneously ensured, and this requires a strong mechanism of constitutional 
review as one form of check and balance.   
4.5 Lessons for Ethiopia from the experiences across time and space 
The experiences of older constitutions around the world regarding constitutional 
adjudication by legislative bodies/assemblies should give lessons to similar 
contemporary designs. The current Ethiopian Constitution, as a late comer, 
should have learned from the past lessons of failures. When the Ethiopian 
experience is compared with that of France and Brazil, it may seem that it is 
relatively better because there are some cases decided by the HoF/CCI. 
However, unlike pre-1946 France and pre-1891 Brazil, we are living in the 21st 
Century where constitutionalism has become more global and citizens 
everywhere are more conscious of their rights.  
The demand for the protection of fundamental rights and constitutionalism 
through strong constitutional review has become an issue in Ethiopia. In light of 
the failure of similar arrangements in France and Brazil, and owing to failures of 
constitutional adjudication in China, the necessity of responding to the demands 
of better protection of rights of citizens and ensuring constitutionalism is 
necessary. There should thus be a constitutional reform regarding who should 
interpret the Constitution.  
                                           
183
 For details of the situations of the protests, see, for instance Awol K. Allo, ‟The Oromo 
protests have changed Ethiopia‟, available at: 
<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/11/oromo-protests-changed-ethiopia-
161119140733350.html>. 
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Constitutional interpretation has important tasks of ensuring the supremacy 
of the constitution, protecting fundamental rights and keeping balance among 
government organs. Weak constitutional review mechanisms fail to achieve 
these purposes. The experiences clearly show that (non-)legislative parliaments 
are not appropriate organs to interpret constitutions. Therefore, Ethiopia should 
draw lessons from the historical and contemporary experiences of the 
jurisdictions under consideration.  
Empowering (non-)legislative assembly to interpret a constitution is not an 
invention of the Constitutions of China or Ethiopia; nor is it something that has 
never been tried in the constitutional histories of nations around the globe.  The 
experiences of France between 1789 and 1946 and that of Brazil between 1824 
and 1891 should serve as a test whether parliaments can successfully exercise 
the power of constitutional adjudication. Both experiments failed thereby 
necessitating a different institution for constitutional interpretation. It could be 
discerned from the constitutional history of France and Brazil and that of the 
contemporary arrangement in China that the Ethiopian Constitution which 
authorizes constitutional adjudication by HoF needs to be amended. In addition 
to the theoretical criticisms forwarded against the HoF as constitutional 
interpreter, its practical problems and failures should indeed give a strong 
message that at this point in time, an independent body should be authorized to 
adjudicate constitutional disputes.  
Conclusion 
Constitutional adjudication is one of the aspects of modern constitutional law 
especially in countries where there is a written constitution. The reasons for 
constitutional interpretation include ensuring supremacy of the constitution, 
limiting powers of the government, and keeping the balance of powers in 
federations. There are variations in the institutions empowered to adjudicate 
constitutional issues. Two models of constitutional adjudication are widely 
accepted. In the diffused model of judicial review, ordinary courts at all levels 
can exercise constitutional review by reserving the power to render authoritative 
interpretation to the Supreme Courts; and the centralized model of judicial 
review entrusts a specialized court with the task of constitutional adjudication.  
On the other hand, constitutional review by (non-)legislative assemblies has 
failed to be effective (as discussed in the preceding sections). In this regard, 
lessons can be drawn from the constitutional history of France and Brazil and 
from contemporary China. The failures in France, Brazil and China should give 
lessons to Ethiopia that constitutional adjudication by parliaments is ineffective. 
The Sénat of France failed because it was a political body and had no interest to 
exercise the power. A similar logic could apply to Brazil. Their experience 
shows that constitutional adjudication by parliaments could not work and 
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achieve the desired purposes of interpreting constitutions. The institutional 
choice in Ethiopia in 1995 could have indeed been informed by the failed 
experience of France, Brazil and China.  
The Constitutions of China and Ethiopia empower (non-)legislative 
assemblies –the NPC/NPCSC and the HoF/CCI– to interpret the constitution. 
Current trends of constitutional review in China and Ethiopia indicate that the 
NPC and the HoF are not properly exercising their power of constitutional 
adjudication. Their political affiliation resulting in the absence of the requisite 
impartiality, lack of interest to exercise the powers and rare meetings per year, 
are among the factors that render these institutions ineffective in exercising their 
powers. These lessons show that the need for reforming the institutional choices 
of Ethiopia in constitutional adjudication is long overdue.                                  ■ 
                                                                                                    
 
 
 
